Cryptographic test Correction
M ultiple choice questionnaires (MCQs) are an assessment procedure invented in 1914 by Frederick J. Kelly. Today, they're widely used in education, opinion polls, and elections. When we first encountered MCQs in the university environment, we faced the daunting challenge of having to grade 600 of them. This installment of Crypto Corner explores the possibility of safely transferring part of an MCQ's correction burden to the examinee-in this case, studentswhen sophisticated technological means such as optical character recognition systems aren't available.
The starting line
An MCQ is a list of n questions {question 1 , …, question n }. Each question i is associated with two potential choices, answer i,0 and answer i,1 , of which only one is correct. We use c to denote the MCQ's answer vector-namely, c i = 1 if and only if answer i,1 is correct.
In a traditional MCQ, the examinee is required to generate an answer vector c´ so that c´i = 1 if and only if he thinks that answer i,1 is correct. The MCQ grader computes the mark m as the difference between n and the Hamming weight of c ⊕ c´.
To transfer the correction burden to the student, the MCQ designer generates a set of 2n public values v i,j , where 1 ≤ i ≤ n and j ∈ {0, 1}.
Students are instructed to generate c´ as before but also ap-• ply an accumulation algorithm ℳ to {v i,j } and c´, and write down the result t = ℳ({v i,j }, c´) on the questionnaire.
The grader then uses a (potentially complex) scoring algorithm to compute the student's final mark m. We call such a procedure a cryptographic test correction (CTC) scheme.
Practical experiments
We tested a simplified (and insecure) CTC on 550 economics freshmen and gave them an additional 30 minutes to account for the extra computational burden due to ℳ. To avoid irresolvable complaints and computational errors, we asked students to both tick the correct answers and use the CTC. We used ticked answers whenever failed to decode the student's mark (27 cases), when a statistical alert occurred, or when the student didn't use ℳ at all (79 cases).
We made the following risk management assumptions:
Because modular arithmetic wasn't part of the curriculum, we assumed that the theoretical tools necessary for cheating weren't at the average student's command. We didn't reveal any parameters or specifications and used a form of psychological warfare: we subtly • • • hinted that the scheme was "probably very resilient to cheating." A cheater who discovered one of the (many) possible cheating strategies would have obtained an excellent mark given the course's subject matter anyway ("Introduction to Computer Science").
The following section describes our experiment in further detail.
Description
We generated five integers {w, k, g > nk, p > (n + 1)g, e} such that gcd(e, p) = 1. We mandated the use of pocket calculators that could handle at least the number (w + 1)np. We then randomly generated the following values:
We denote by A the sum of a i and define
We also define y i = (¬c i ⊕ c' i )k, so that y i takes the value k if the student correctly answered question i (otherwise, y i = 0). Finally, we constructed the values
We instructed the students to sum the v i,j corresponding to their answers and answer randomly whenever they didn't know the answer. (We need to re-form A for decryption to work and, in addition, it seems desirable to prevent any would-be "cryptanalyst" from generating t values corresponding -A mod p, which is and recovered the exact value mk + gq, where 0 ≤ q ≤ n. But because mk ≤ nk < g, we can retrieve mk and q without ambiguity. If m isn't a positive integer smaller than n, or if q isn't in the range [0, n] , the mark decoding fails, which triggers a manual form verification.
The odds of hitting a multiple of k by picking t at random are 1/k. Our MCQ had n = 80 questions. To reduce computational errors, we provided the students with a form in which they had to report 20 numbers. We instructed them to add four consecutive v i,j values using the calculator's M+ key and then subtract the v i,j 's again to control that no addition error occurred. If no error occurred, the student could recall the result using the MRC key and copy the sum into the form. The 20 numbers were divided into five groups of four numbers. Each group of four intermediate sums was added again, using the same procedure. Finally, the student added five partial sums to get t.
To ease the students' task, we provided a lookup table in the test's appendix. For each group of four consecutive questions, the table gave 16 possible sums, so students could compute t by adding (and controlling the addition of ) only 25 integers.
Statistical analysis
Unfortunately, the scheme is insecure-if a student knows the algorithm's specifications, he or she can find several efficient cheating strategies. For instance, the cheater could identify one correct answer-say, i-subtract the incorrect v i,j from the correct one, and get a "clean" encoding of +k. The cheater could then pick random answers to the entire questionnaire, achieve an expected average mark of n/2, and artificially improve it by adding a multiple of k.
To overcome this (to some extent), we used a basic statistical test on q-namely, if q exceeded a given likelihood threshold, we treated the MCQ as suspicious and verified it manually. Indeed, if the cheater brutally adds multiples of k to the encoded mark, a corresponding multiple of ±g will start showing up as a statistical bias in the distribution of q. We therefore triggered an additional manual verification whenever |q -40| ≥ 7.
A student could use much smarter cheating strategies based on the linear combination of several encodings of +k, derived from different questions and weighted by moderate coefficients, but we considered such a strategy unlikely given our risk management assumptions. We conjecture that no student tried to cheat, but the scheme's clumsiness and poor security performances motivated the quest for alternative CTC mechanisms, some of which we describe in the next section.
Alternative

CTC mechanisms
An alternative solution to the CTC problem is the development of new MCQ mechanisms. This section describes such a scheme: interval estimation MCQs (IEMCQs).
Again, we associate question i with two potential choices, answer i,0 and answer i,1 , of which only one is correct. In the IEMCQ, answer i,0 is printed in blue, whereas answer i,1 is printed in red. (The use of colors isn't mandatory-any form of distinction between answers will do, such as preceding them with symbols). The idea is to have students determine the (correct) number of (correct) red answers. In other words, the student's output is a sequence of three digits: the number of red answers, the number of blue answers, and (implicitly) the difference between n and the sum of the previous two-that is, the number of unsolved questions. We can encode this output using only two integers, and we ask for an interval containing the number of red answers.
Assuming, for example, that n = 9 and that the student identifies two reds and three blues, the student's answer will be [2, 6] . This notation means that the student thinks the MCQ has at least two reds and at most 6 = 9 -3 reds. The low and high bounds are denoted by a and c (here, a = 2 and c = 6), whereas b denotes the correct answer (that is, the precise number of reds). In other words, [a, c] reads as "I hope that a ≤ b ≤ c." The interval's narrowness reflects the student's knowledge.
Evidently, if questions are independent, we would expect b ≃ n/2, so we must first pick b randomly in [0, n] and color the IEMCQ accordingly. In practice, we recommend n = 9 because this shrinks the student's answer to two decimal digits (compact notation) and allows the mark to approach a 100-point scale using 11 question packs. Unlike additive CTCs, filling an IEMCQ doesn't require a pocket calculator.
Mapping [a, c] to a grade (scoring) is the most delicate part of the process because the scoring function must faithfully reflect the student's knowledge, be fairly resilient to statistical attacks, and have a small standard deviation. Additionally, we want IEMCQs to let students who know an answer with sufficiently high probability (say, 80 percent) benefit from this knowledge. Because our objectives are independent and incomparable, an "ideal" scoring function might not exist, so we looked for functions that reasonably comply with our objectives. The following proposals are thus examples and not reference designs.
We start with a basic scoring function 1 and refine it progressively, explaining at each step the rationale for our successive refinements. To simplify calculations, we assume that a correct answer www.computer.org/security/ ■ ieee seCurity & PrivaCy is rewarded with a point, whereas an incorrect answer is penalized by a point.
Notations and definitions
The 
We also define two auxiliary variables:
and where ∆ is the number of possibilities the student has ruled out, and d expresses the difference between the ratio of reds that the student estimates (a/∆) and the actual ratio of reds (b/n) in the IEMCQ.
Heaviside scoring
We define Heaviside scoring as
Intuitively, 1 correlates the student's grade to the number of ruled-out possibilities. The role of the penalty component (H a,c (b) -1)(n + 1) is to equate the expectation of random guessing to zero.
1 complies with all desirable design criteria but resilience to statistical attacks. Indeed, a cheater could use the proportion of reds he spots as an estimate (sample) of the actual ratio of reds in the IEMCQ (IEMCQ "redness") and narrow his interval accordingly. This might significantly optimize his grade-for example, if the cheater successfully detected three reds and no blues among n = 9, the risk taken by betting that the unknown answers contain two more reds is moderate. We call such cheaters "narrowers."
Distance scoring
In addition, 1 's penalty component is insensitive to the magnitude of mistakes. After all, it would be desirable to penalize a { [a, c] 
Although it seems clear that a gradual penalty implies using d a,c (x), there seems to be no obvious way to tune the penalty function (other than increasing the penalty as d a,c (x) grows). We therefore used the probability (d) of missing b by d units to fine-tune a linear penalty coefficient s 1 :
Note that (x) reflects the test's hardness.
Typically, the configurations (1) = (2) = 1/2 or {(1) = 6/10, (2) = 3/10, (3) = 1/10} are 1 -compatible when s 1 = 2/3. A student's answer isn't only an interval, it also expresses a redness approximation. Generally, a (nonexaggerating) narrower will score the same ∆ as an honest student, but his redness estimate will be less accurate-in other words, his d will be expectedly bigger. We thus use d to damp ∆, and finally define distance scoring as 3 (n, a,
Father Christmas scoring
During the French revolution, the Jacobins debated different strategies for abolishing birth privileges. Proposals ranged from forbidding titles to exiling noblemen or making titles available to anyone (that is, to eliminate distinctions by devaluation).
All our scoring functions let cheaters estimate the IEMCQ's redness. While attempting to limit the cheaters' redness estimation abilities (using d), we can also reduce the cheaters' relative advantage by devaluation-namely, we automatically award to any student the cheaters' redness approximation advantage. We call this Father Christmas scoring because we're distributing extra points to all the students. To implement such a scoring scheme 4, we proceed as follows: (c -a) 
